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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents a conceptual framework on how institutions of property rights 
and collective action can contribute to poverty reduction, including through external 
interventions and action by poor people themselves. The first part of the paper 
examines the initial conditions of poverty, highlighting the role of assets, risks and 
vulnerability, legal structures and power relations. The latter part investigates the 
decision-making dynamics of actors—both poor and non-poor—and how they can 
use the tangible and intangible resources they have to shape their livelihoods and 
the institutions that govern their lives. The paper concludes with a discussion of 
how attention to property rights and collective action can improve the 
understanding of outcomes in terms of changes in wellbeing.  
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PROPERTY RIGHTS, COLLECTIVE ACTION, AND POVERTY  
The Role of Institutions for Poverty Reduction  
Monica Di Gregorio,
1 Konrad Hagedorn, Michael Kirk, Benedikt Korf, Nancy 
McCarthy, Ruth Meinzen-Dick, and Brent Swallow  
1. INTRODUCTION 
The fact that growth alone is not sufficient to reduce poverty has been recognized 
since the mid 1960s in the development discourse. Benefits from economic growth 
have often bypassed specific groups, generally the poorer sections of society. In 
some cases, growth has been accompanied by increasing internal inequality and a 
widening gap between rich and poor. This evidence indicates that changes in social 
and economic processes are necessary to reduce poverty (Wolfensohn and 
Bourguignon, 2004) and that not only growth, but the attention to the distribution 
of benefits from growth is crucial to combat poverty. 
Still, in the last decades reduction of poverty has been only modest in many 
areas of the world, and poverty has actually increased in a number of countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. Although, overall, the 
proportion of the poor seems to have diminished, their absolute numbers continue 
to rise (World Bank, 2001; Hoddinott et al., 2003). The failure of both strict state 
control and unregulated market policies to reduce poverty brought a new focus on 
the role of governance institutions as well as on more micro-oriented targeted 
approaches. As growth and poverty reduction started to be considered 
complementary goals, approaches to poverty focused more directly on expanding 
participation of the poor in growth. Similarly, developmental aims of governments, 
NGOs, and donor organizations moved towards bringing voice and participation to 
the poor (Narayan and Petesh, 2002). 
While most attention on institutional factors affecting poverty concentrated 
on state institutions and good governance approaches advocating transparency and 
accountability as well as public participation, in this paper we want to bring to the 
center stage the institutions of property rights and collective action and their role 
with respect to other institutional factors often neglected in poverty research: the 
importance of governance factors that do not only pertain to state institutions, but 
also include forms of self-governance, the underlying role of power and social 
relations, and ideological factors in constraining choices as well as in creating 
opportunities. The key role played by property rights, the scope for collective action 
in generating wealth and well-being, and how to enable the poor to benefit from 
these institutions are the common threads that are investigated in the rest of this 
paper with regard to different factors affecting poverty. 
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2 
Learning from institutional analysis of natural resource management 
While the importance of institutions has not always been central to the poverty 
literature,
 2 the past two decades have witnessed an increased understanding of the 
role of institutions of property rights and collective action in natural resource 
management (Ostrom et al., 2001; Baland and Platteau, 1996; Bromley, 1992).
 The 
insights gained on the role of formal and informal property rights and collective 
action institutions in improving natural resource management can help us 
understand their broader effects on wellbeing and can assist both research and 
policies for poverty reduction. An institutional approach to the study of poverty can 
shed light on the same issues of governance and power relations as well as on 
ideological factors that keep people in poverty. 
Security of property rights provides not only an income stream today, but 
also incentives to invest in productive technologies and sustainable practices. The 
rural poor are usually those with weakest property rights, and security of rights 
over land, water, trees, livestock, fish, and genetic resources are fundamental 
mechanisms for reducing poverty. However, many government programs are 
implemented without an understanding of the complexity of property rights and 
have sometimes led to reduced tenure security for poor and marginalized groups, 
for example, by weakening customary rights or allowing elite capture of property. 
Better understanding of how the poor can protect and expand their access to and 
control over resources can make a powerful contribution to poverty reduction.  
There is also growing recognition of the importance of social capital as an 
asset for poverty reduction (Moser, 1996). Social capital creates the capacity for 
collective action that allows even smallholders to work together to overcome 
limitations of wealth, farm size, and bargaining power. Collective action is also 
needed to adopt many technologies and natural resource management practices 
that operate at the landscape level (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2002). As with property 
rights, the poor and women are often at a disadvantage when it comes to collective 
action because of social exclusion, lack of time to participate in meetings and 
activities, lack of education and confidence to speak in meetings, and domination 
by local elites.  
Research gaps 
Demand for research on the links between poverty and the institutions governing 
property rights and collective action is widespread and growing (ActionAid, 2003; 
Braden, 2003; Datta and Hossain, 2003). A wide range of policymakers require 
relevant research findings that can inform policies on property rights and collective 
action to improve the livelihoods of the poor. This includes helping the poor gain a 
voice in debates on poverty (Narayan and Pritchett, 2000). 
Despite the importance of property rights and collective action for poverty 
reduction, there is still a knowledge gap regarding the ways that the poor are 
affected by changes in the property rights regime. For example, de Soto (2000) has 
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made a strong case for formalization of property rights, based on experience in 
urban settings of Egypt, Haiti, Peru, and the Philippines. However this work has 
been challenged for not considering the political economy of property institutions 
and whether the findings from these urban case studies have broader applicability. 
The outcomes of other reforms aimed at providing titles to individuals and groups 
to improve tenure security and encourage investment and productivity have not 
achieved these goals (Home and Lim, 2004; Okoth-Ogendo, 2000). 
Further research is required to directly address the question of how poverty 
shapes men’s and women’s incentives and abilities to engage in collective action 
(Thorp et al., 2003) and maintain claims to resources on the one hand, and how 
different property rights and collective action institutions affect the poor, women, 
and marginalized groups on the other hand. Distributional and equity consequences 
of alternative property rights systems and collective action interventions need to be 
evaluated. At the same time, it is critical to assess factors that condition the impact 
of these interventions, including the asset base of households and the community, 
the risks they face, the prevailing power relations, and social and legal structures.  
Aims and outline of the paper 
This paper presents a conceptual framework for examining how property rights and 
collective action can contribute to poverty reduction, including both external 
interventions and action by poor people themselves. We also try to provide some 
examples and refer to both empirical and theoretical literature, although a 
comprehensive review of the literature on such broad issues is outside the scope of 
the paper. We hope that this framework can provide a guide for future empirical 
research. For scholars and practitioners of natural resource management studies 
this framework can provide a way to increase their focus on poverty reduction 
outcomes. For those involved in poverty research it provides an introduction to the 
concepts of property rights and collective action and an institutional lens on the 
causes of poverty and the potential roles of institutions in reducing poverty. 
In the next sections we present some definitions of the key concepts. We 
then turn to the examination of how property rights and collective action are 
related to poverty outcomes, building upon the Institutional Analysis and 
Development (IAD) framework. We begin with the more static contextual factors 
affecting poverty and then move to the more dynamic aspects focusing on the 
action arena. We conclude with a discussion of how this framework can improve our 




Concepts of poverty 
Poverty is globally acknowledged as a serious debilitation of human welfare and 
potential. Despite this general agreement, definitions and measures of poverty vary 
widely. Monetary measures of poverty (one of the most used international indicator 
of poverty is US $1/ capita)
3 are subject to widespread critique for being too 
narrow. Thus, while the World Bank uses income measures overall, some of its 
publications made a compelling case for the need to consider poverty in broader 
terms (Narayan and Petesh, 2002; World Bank, 2001).
 4 
The United Nations defines poverty as “a human condition characterized by 
the sustained or chronic deprivation of the resources, capabilities, choices, security 
and power necessary for the enjoyment of an adequate standard of living and other 
civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights,” (United Nations, 2001) which 
refers to Sen’s (1999: 85) definition of poverty as “‘capability deprivation.”
5 This 
broader focus on choice and freedoms brings to the fore social relations, 
constraints, and opportunities which can be affected by property rights and 
collective action institutions.  
Research and policy orientation on poverty issues have undergone a shift in 
conceptualization of “the poor” from passive recipients of development efforts to 
those who can contribute to their own livelihood improvements if state institutions 
provided the conditions for them to do so (Chambers, 1996). The concept of 
poverty itself is characteristic of developmentalist approaches, which favor a 
Western conception of poverty.
6 In this respect, the terms “poor” and “non-poor” 
can be perceived as externally imposed categories and do not reflect locally-
perceived differences, as well as possibly being derogative. Subjective valuation of 
well-being can provide a different and more contextually-specific perspective on 
livelihood conditions.  
Because poverty is embedded in a socio-economic system, it is always 
relative to a socially defined threshold. A person with a given level of income, food, 
shelter, or clothing may be considered poor in one society, but not in another. 
Therefore, the distinction between absolute and relative poverty can be important. 
While the concept of absolute poverty highlights universal thresholds (basic needs, 
for example) and allows for cross-country comparisons (Lok-Dessallien, 1998), 
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relative poverty stresses conditions and consequences of inequality within societies 
and within units in society (Townsend, 1979; Sen, 1985). In addition, moderately 
poor and extremely poor are often distinguished, and those poor who do not have a 
fair chance to escape poverty are often termed chronic poor (Hulme and Shepherd, 
2003). Another often cited distinction is between situational and generational 
poverty (Payne et al., 2001), the former being related to a specific event (often 
divorce, death, or illness), while the latter reflects poverty experienced for more 
than two generations, where welfare of offspring is mainly dependent on their 
parents’ welfare.  
Dimensions of poverty 
Whatever the precise definition used,
 7 poor people share several key attributes, 
which are both a result and a cause of poverty:
8 
•  inability to secure basic needs (shelter, food, health) 
•  lack of income (or control over assets that can provide income) 
•  social exclusion (from social networks or more formal organizations)  
•  political exclusion (inability to participate in the political process) 
•  vulnerability (to such things as natural disasters, socio-political instability, 
market/price risks) 
•  lack of sustainability (of resource base—livelihood strategies—and 
institutions) 
All of these factors ultimately affect people’s choice set and translate into 
lack of opportunities to improve ones own conditions. 
The last two conditions, in particular, indicate that poverty is not a static 
condition, but rather must be examined as a dynamic process. Much research has 
investigated vulnerability, sustainability, chronic versus transient poverty, and 
poverty traps (Vosti and Reardon, 1997; Hulme and Shepherd, 2003; Barrett and 
Swallow, 2004). Such analyses often focus on the individual or household, without 
taking into account the role of complex social interactions in determining 
vulnerability. One aspect often neglected is the role of power relations between the 
poor and other actors in society. In many cases, overcoming poverty requires 
overcoming relationships that keep people poor. 
3. DEFINING PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Property rights as bundles of rights 
Though there are many definitions of property rights, here we use the definition of 
property rights as “the capacity to call upon the collective to stand behind one’s 
claim to a benefit stream” (Bromley, 1991:15). Thus, property rights involve a 
relationship between the right holder and other members of the group as well as an 
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institution that backs up the claim by placing a corresponding duty on others to 
uphold the right.  
Rights do not necessarily imply sole authority to use and dispose of a 
resource (or full ownership). The claim to a benefit stream can refer to a number of 
different bundles of rights, which do not require complete control over a resource. 
Following the concept of property rights as developed under Roman law, these 
bundles of rights can be grouped as: 
•  the rights to use the asset (usus), including access and withdrawal;  
•  the right to appropriate the return from the asset (usus fructus), including 
earning income from it; 
•  the right to change its form, substance, and location (abusus), including 
decision-making rights such as management and exclusion.  
To these can be added alienation—the right to transfer rights to others, 
either by inheritance, sale, or gift. Complete title is generally interpreted as holding 
all four sets of rights—usus, usus fructus, abusus, and alienation (Pejovich, 1990; 
Cooter and Ulen, 1997).  
If we look at property rights in terms of bundles we realize that different 
individuals, families, groups, or even the state often hold overlapping use and 
decision-making rights over specific resources. It is important to keep in mind that 
assigning an exclusive right automatically implies that others cannot receive the 
same benefit stream. In this sense the initial distribution of rights counts in terms 
of who benefits and will benefit in the future. Both situations of enforcement 
problems and disputed rights show that property rights systems affect resource 
distribution and, as such, any perceived intervention geared toward changing the 
property rights system becomes a highly politically charged issue. This partly 
explains why, for example, land reform programs are prone to stir reactions from 
civil society and polarize factions.  
Supporting institutions  
To be effective, property rights need recognition and legitimacy. This, in turn, 
implies the need for governance structures that enforce rights and the 
corresponding duties of others to respect those rights. The functions of these 
governance structures include supervision, sanctioning in case of non-compliance, 
and provision of forums for resolving disputes over property rights. The institutions 
that provide legitimacy can be diverse and are based on some, more or less formal, 
form of collective action. Rights can be backed by state law, with police and courts 
at different levels to enforce and sanction. However, customary laws can also 
provide legitimacy to property rights claims, which may be enforced by village 
chiefs and local observances through social exclusion. Religious laws or other 
normative principles may also provide a basis for claiming rights; how effective 
these claims backed by different legal systems are depends on the extent to which 
others recognize those rights,
 9 either because of a sense of internalized legitimacy 
or external enforcement.
  
                                                      
 




Collective action can be understood as an action taken by a group of individuals to 
achieve common interests (Marshall, 1998). Collective action can be voluntary or 
obligatory for specific persons, such as in water users associations where all land 
owners in an irrigation scheme are obliged to join an association for collective 
action.
10 Members can act directly on their own or through an organization. 
Collective action is often considered narrowly in terms of activities 
undertaken through formal organizations, but many formal organizations exist on 
paper only and do not foster any real collective action, whereas much collective 
action occurs informally through social networks or even through people coming 
together temporarily for specific short-term purposes (Bruns, 1992; Badstue et al., 
2002). Thus, as with property rights, it is essential to look at both formal and 
informal institutions that govern collective action. The exact role of these 
governance structures depends on the nature of the collective action or good(s) 
involved, but, in general, they play a key role in coordinating the actions and 
contributions of members. Collective action as any form of cooperation is costly. 
Where benefits from collective activities (such as planting of vegetation along 
riverbanks to reduce runoff and erosion) cannot be withheld from people that do 
not participate in the collective effort, free riding can break down cooperative 
effort: some people will be tempted not to help with the planting, but will 
nonetheless enjoy the benefits from others people’s work. Collective rules can help 
reduce the likelihood of free riding. These can include rules of use, monitoring, and 
sanctioning, which all reduce the incentives to free ride as well as provide 
assurance to other members that their peers will also be contributing (McCarthy, 
2004).  
4. PROPERTY RIGHTS, COLLECTIVE ACTION, AND POVERTY: A 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
If we are to move from definitions of poverty to strategies for poverty reduction, 
then we need a conceptual framework to improve our understanding of how 
attention to property rights and collective action can contribute.  
Our framework builds upon the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) 
framework (Ostrom, 2005, Oakerson, 1992), which provides a general set of 
variables, and their relationships that are crucial in any type of institutional 
analysis. It is thus useful for organizing diagnostic and prescriptive inquiry. We 
adapt this framework to a more specialized institutional analysis of poverty and 
highlight why and how institutions of property rights and collective action may 
mediate against initial conditions and poverty outcomes. The framework (Figure 1) 
is separated into a “context” section and an “action arena” section.  
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The context represents the initial socio-economic and political conditions 
shaping the opportunity set of people for possible actions. It illustrates the status 
people find themselves in and that determines, for example, if they are born in poor 
or rich families, if they can afford education, if they are subject to social exclusion, 
and so forth. Within the context we highlight three conditions that are most 
relevant to the poor. The first condition is the asset base. Income has been the 
main focus of the poverty literature for a long time, while the role of assets in 
reducing poverty has often been neglected (Sherraden, 1991). The intrinsic 
problem of lack of assets and obstacles to assets accumulation for the poor 
highlights the importance of property rights arrangements and needs serious 
consideration. The second condition refers to shocks, risks, and the vulnerability of 
people to fall into poverty. Understanding the uncertainties that the poor in 
particular face can help devise mitigating and coping mechanisms. The third 
condition, which affects both asset endowment and vulnerability to shocks, is the 
political structure of a society—represented by its existing legal structure and power 
relations between actors, which generally disadvantages the poor. In turn, these 
three factors affect institutions of property rights and institutions of collective action 
(such as the existing distribution of property rights in a society, criteria used to 
assign property rights, and rules that regulate collective decision-making and 
Evaluative Criteria of 
outcomes: 
•  Income 
•  Basic Needs 
•  Security (person + property) 
•  Social and political inclusion 

























Action Arena  
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collective activities in the society and in sub-groups), which are themselves part of 
the initial context. 
Property rights are determined, in the first instance, by the legal and political 
structure of society. They are at least partly reflected in the assets people control 
and can be affected by people’s ability to mitigate and cope with diverse shocks. At 
the same time, property rights themselves affect future accumulation of assets and 
vulnerability to future shocks and possible loss of assets. Moreover, property rights 
over valuable assets do not only provide wealth but also status, both of which in 
turn influence the power that people have in their society. 
Collective action institutions, or the rules affecting cooperative behavior of 
people and groups of people, including social norms, sanctions for non-compliance, 
and enforcement mechanisms, are also part of the contextual conditions that 
people face. The legal and political structure of a society affects rules regarding 
cooperation in society and single groups; for example, the guarantee of freedom of 
association facilitates formal collective action. Social norms might include 
reciprocity rules that discourage free-riding or, on the other hand, might favor 
distrust with makes cooperation more costly. Exposure to risk and shocks can affect 
incentives to cooperate, and collective action institutions can be used to spread 
risk. Finally, property rights arrangements providing assets also affect cooperation 
through their effects on incentives and by providing the means to invest in (costly) 
cooperation.  
The second section of the framework, the action arena, helps us to illustrate 
how people themselves, the state and other entities, and different actors together 
can make use of institutions of property rights and collective action as well as 
change institutions to reduce poverty. While the context portrays the initial 
conditions that affect peoples’ actions, people’s agency (the actions themselves), 
and their interactions with other people or actors shape their future. The action 
arena represents possible action situations, for example a decision about investing 
resources, or a negotiation situation between different interest groups, or the 
collective efforts to maintain a local irrigation system. 
In this paper we focus on actions that interest more than one actor and thus 
require people to interact. Many outcomes cannot be achieved individually, and 
cooperation is often necessary to achieve collective goals. In the action arena we 
have a set of actors facing a specific action situation. Different actors have different 
preferences, information-processing capabilities, mental maps, assets, and power 
resources. These are part of the action resources that individual or collective actors 
have at their disposal and are determined by the context that an actor faces, as 
well as by which other actors are part of the specific action situation. Each action 
situation is also shaped by social rules about behavior, use of resources, and 
decision-making mechanisms, which are also determined by contextual conditions. 
Decision-making rules are particularly important in the action arena, as they 
represent the “authority relationships that specify who decides what in relation to 
whom” (Oakerson, 1992, emphasis in the original). The actors, their action 
resources, and the applicable rules all delimit the space within which actors make 
choices and take action in a specific action situation. Different actors will have 
different limits and opportunities within any single action situation according not 
only to their contextual conditions, but also to the contextual position of the other 
actors involved. In the action arena parties act independently, wait for actions of  
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counterparts, cooperate, discuss, negotiate, challenge each other, and so on. They 
exchange resources, devise new rules, and demand action from other parties. Our 
interest in the rest of this paper is to highlight how action, and specifically 
cooperation between the poor, can bring about change. 
Over time specific actions create patterns of interaction, which may, in turn, 
affect the initial conditions of the next round. Patterns of interactions refer to the 
regularized and observable behavioral outcomes of actors acting within a specified 
set of rules. In these interaction processes, actors reinforce existing institutions or 
create new institutions. Existing (a priori) institutions delineate the socio-economic 
space and the rule-boundedness within which actors make their choices and take 
action. For example, often rules and norms constrain women’s voice and their 
ability to assert claims. On the other hand, while institutions constrain, allow, and 
affect actions a priori, actions may alter institutions a posteriori (Giddens, 1984), 
thus changing the initial conditions (See feedback arrows in Figure 1). One example 
is when concerted and sustained action over time increases women’s rights. Figure 
1 places patterns of interaction deliberately outside of the action arena, not 
because these interactions do not occur within the action arena, but because we 
want to make explicit a behavioral outcome that is conditioned by certain features 
of actors interacting within a defined set of rules that are of interest to the 
researcher or policy maker. In an example from Nepal (Box 1), successful collective 
action resulted in material outcomes of enhanced performance of the irrigation 
system and increased agricultural productivity. 
Finally, actions and patterns of interactions lead to outcomes. Outcomes are 
as varied as the action situations; they can refer to direct effects on wellbeing, such 
as an increase in income due to a good harvest, or they can refer to changes in 
institutions themselves, such as strengthening of collective action capacity and 
redesigning of property rights arrangements. Actions geared toward social and 
political structural changes (as opposed to more immediate outcomes) generally 
require a longer time frame to realize and thus necessitate a long-term analysis. A 
number of feedback loops from patterns of interaction and intermediate outcomes 
back to the action arena and the context might be needed before institutional 
changes will affect the lives of the poor, such as through improved social and 
political inclusion, income, health, security, sustainability, and reduced 
vulnerability. These last indicators can serve as final evaluative criteria to assess 
outcomes in terms of poverty reduction.  
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Box 1. Institutions, Actors, Interactions, and Outcomes in Nepal’s 
Irrigation Systems 
 
Source: Lam 1998 
5. THE CONTEXT: INITIAL CONDITIONS AND POVERTY 
In the next three sections we investigate the three main aspects of the context and 
the relationship to both property rights and collective action. First we discuss 
people’s assets endowments, next their vulnerability to shocks, and finally, the 
basic institutional structure of the legal and political system that regulates and 
governs basic interactions among people within a specific society and how these 
affect people’s livelihood strategies.  
Asset Endowments, Poverty, Property Rights, and Collective Action 
The link between available resources and ability to choose is universally recognized. 
While many economists restrict the choice concept to the individual choice of 
allocation of assets between different uses, other approaches, such as Sen’s 
capability approach (1999), view assets only as a minor component determining 
freedom of choice. It is, nonetheless, an important starting point to assess poverty 
because it affects the constraints that people face and the opportunities they have 
in choosing their livelihood strategies.  
We can distinguish physical, financial, social, natural, and human capital 
assets as all being part of the initial endowment of a person or household (Ellis, 
2000; Carney, 1998). Assets endowments (or the pool of resources or assets 
available to an individual or household) include not only the well-recognized 
physical assets, but also rights to access, use, and manage resources (such as 
In Nepal, the incentives facing farmers and irrigation officials in agency managed irrigation 
systems (AMIS) and farmer managed irrigation systems (FMIS) structure their actions and 
interactions and ultimately determine the relative performance of these irrigation systems. 
Irrigation performance, measured by physical condition of irrigation structures, water 
delivery effectiveness, and agricultural productivity of the systems, is on average higher in 
FMIS than AMIS. 
The difference in performance of FMIS and AMIS in Nepal can be understood by the 
extent to which their respective governance structures are conducive to the development of 
cooperation. The governance structure of FMIS tends to emphasize patterns of interaction 
that are characterized by problem-solving, a high degree of mutual trust, reciprocity, and 
active participation in rule-crafting and monitoring, and a high rule conformance. Such a 
governance structure enables farmers to evolve rules to coordinate their activities and the 
cumulating of social capital. These patterns of interaction are the basis upon which high 
levels of irrigation performance are attained. 
By contrast, the governance structure of AMIS is based upon and reinforces a 
dominance-dependence relationship between irrigation officials and farmers, which creates a 
situation in which neither officials nor farmers have positive incentives to contribute. Farmers 
are discouraged from taking initiatives to deal with problems. Irrigation officials bear the 
burden of managing a system that they have little expertise, resources, and incentives to 
handle. They are also unable to monitor and enforce all the rules all the time. When irrigation 
officials have little incentive to ensure that systems are well-managed, low levels of 
performance result.   
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collecting firewood from the forest or renting a piece of land), personal skills gained 
through education or other learning experiences, and social networks based on 
trust and reciprocity. All these assets, both tangible and intangible, are 
fundamental in determining the starting point for the choice of livelihood strategy of 
an individual or household and in determining their well-being. Control over 
tangible assets often implies some from of formal or informal property rights 
arrangement. Current asset endowments generally depend on intergenerational 
transmission of assets, past investments in health and education, and past policies 
(Hoddinott et al., 2003).  
Individually or household-held endowments 
Often the abilities to work and acquire skills are the main resources poor people 
have. Poor people generally own few assets and often have to rely on contractual 
arrangements. For example, sharecropping can provide access to land and even 
access to credit if combined with a credit contract. When actors merge resources in 
this way to produce output, institutions determine how the output is shared, 
according to market prices, distorted markets, social rules, state regulations, or a 
combination of all of the above. These institutions often cause disadvantages to the 
poor, resulting, for example, in high interest rates and rental prices.  
Access to natural resources and their conditions also become important 
especially for the rural poor. Access to state owned pasture or to a small fishing 
ground can provide an important addition to household income. Natural resource 
conditions will clearly affect the level of income derived from the resource. Poor 
people often have access to marginal resources of low quality only, whose 
productive potential is very limited.  
Although many studies assume that household-level assets are pooled and 
used for the benefit if all members, research indicates that this assumption does 
not hold (Alderman et al., 1995; Quisumbing, 2003). In particular, assets held by 
women and men within the household may be used for different purposes; hence it 
is important to consider how assets are distributed within, as well as between, 
households, particularly for their impact on poverty.  
Communal and public assets 
Apart from people’s personal assets, people’s livelihoods can benefit from access to 
assets held in common, by a group, a community, or the state, such as access to 
public goods and services. Common goods, such as community forests or pastures, 
or access to public health facilities or water delivery systems provide a benefit 
stream that improves people’s livelihoods. Other public services affect people’s 
asset holdings through their effect on vulnerability. Access to health care, social 
safety net provision such as unemployment allowances, access to hardship loans, or 
relief programs in the case of natural disasters can not only satisfy some basic 
needs, but can also prevent asset losses that may result due to distress sales, 
livestock deaths, or inability to work due to poor health and nutrition.  
As much as security of rights to a private asset is a prerequisite to consider it 
part of person’s asset endowment, so must public goods and services be accessible 
to affect people’s livelihoods. Thus, the presence of a public well, forest, school, or 
health facility in a village does not automatically imply access for all. Sometimes  
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additional resources are needed (such as financial assets), or some people are 
simply excluded from access. In poor regions public services might not be available 
at all, while poor people in well-serviced areas might still lack access to certain 
public services.  
Complementary and substitute assets 
Certain assets may be leveraged to gain access to yet more assets; and combining 
assets, individually or as group, can increase their overall value. For example, 
human capital in the form of agricultural knowledge greatly improves returns to 
land. Many land reform programs did not have anticipated effects on poverty 
because they did not put enough emphasis on the human capital needed to make a 
piece of land productive and often ignored access to other complementary inputs 
such as access to credit, input and output markets, transportation, storage, and so 
on. Assets can also partly substitute for each other, as, for example, wild forest 
products in case of crop failure. Complementarity and substitutability indicate that 
holding a diversity of assets is advantageous, increases livelihood choices, and 
reduces vulnerability.  
Similarly, access to certain public goods and services can also dramatically 
increase the productivity of individually-held assets. The construction of a road 
reduces transportation costs and likely increases information flows, making items 
produced for the market more competitive and increasing land prices.
11 Similarly, 
access to literacy programs and public education improves human capital, leading 
to higher potential earnings. Although both poor as well as non-poor benefit in 
general, public education and public health should have at least mildly progressive 
impacts on the poor. These examples show that there are many ways in which to 
directly and indirectly increase the asset base of the poor and to revalue the asset 
base they possess.  
Assets thresholds and poverty traps 
The poverty trap literature indicates that there are thresholds in transforming 
assets in income, which constrain the ability to accumulate capital goods that would 
allow higher returns (Dercon and Krishnan, 1996; Dasgupta, 2003; Barrett et al., 
2001). Poverty traps are inherently linked to asset poverty, as one of the 
characteristics of poverty traps is the existence of critical wealth thresholds that are 
difficult to cross (Barrett and McPeak, 2003). Individuals and households may be 
constrained to a specific pathway (Pender et al., 2001; Hoddinott et al., 2003) and 
often end up in a pattern of persistent poverty and with a constant depletion of the 
resource base they depend upon (Coomes et al., 2000; Barrett et al., 2002). 
Barrett and Swallow (2004) indicate the following factors as sufficient conditions for 
the existence of poverty traps at the household level: incomplete access to financial 
markets, minimum efficient scale of production yielding high return which are 
beyond the means of the credit-constrained poor, or risk and subsistence 
constraints that discourage long-term investment in high-return assets 
(Zimmerman and Carter, 2003).  
                                                      
 
11 Although higher land prices is turn gives an advantage to land owners compared to tenants.   
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A first threshold, the inability to satisfy completely basic needs, affects the 
capacity of the individual to work and constrains accumulation of human capital 
which dramatically affects future earning (Dasgupta, 1997; Strauss and Thomas, 
1998). It is largely recognized that basic needs have to be met first since they 
provide adequate health conditions that allow an individual to become more 
productive. Nutritional status affects both physical and mental development, and 
thus an individual’s ability to work (Dasgupta, 2003:1). This most extreme case of 
poverty trap at the micro level is also responsible for intergenerational transmission 
of poverty where the household-scale financial constraints also result in 
underinvestment in the education of children and transmit poverty across 
generations (Loury, 1981).  
Another major threshold that keeps households and individuals in chronic 
poverty is the inability to undertake lumpy investments that would allow them to 
acquire physical or natural assets to move to a more productive livelihood strategy. 
Lack of access to financial assets because of imperfect financial markets is the 
major constraint in this case. The poor generally have to self-finance as they often 
cannot access these markets. Because many investments are not incremental but 
lumpy (livestock or land), the poor often cannot reach more productive livelihood 
strategies. Collective action can provide a way to pool resources together.  
Subsistence needs and lack of access to external insurance also restrict the 
ability of the poor to undertake long-term and risky high-yielding investments. The 
inability to undertake long-term investment does not only reduce current income 
flows, but can foster unsustainable management practices that deplete natural 
resources (soil, forest, and so on), again affecting sustainability of future income 
flows of the household and reducing the asset base for the future, thus increasing 
the likelihood to transmit poverty to the next generation.  
Links to property rights and collective action 
As discussed previously, assets provide the basis for choices. Investments are 
critical choices since they affect both current and future outcomes. For the 
sustainable productive use of agricultural and natural resources, property rights are 
crucial. For instance, there is little incentive to invest in soil conservation measures 
for a squatter occupying public land without permission because of the uncertainty 
of tenure. Uncertain tenure often implies that the risk that benefits from the 
investment will be lost (or appropriated by someone else) is extremely high. Thus, 
the security of the property right is indispensable to provide incentives to invest.
12  
Property rights held by poor people are often insecure. Insecure rights have 
overall less value compared to secure rights, as the likelihood to capture future 
benefits stream is reduced. Moreover, insecure rights contribute to shorten the time 
horizons over which a person considers return to investment. Together with 
subsistence requirements, which also put more value on the present compared to 
                                                      
 
12 Note that in some cases, investing in land provides a basis for strengthening one’s claim to the 
property, and this can provide an incentive for investment. For example, in some cases planting trees 
may provide a basis for claiming land (Fortmann and Bruce; 1988, Otsuka and Place, 2001), or 
building a canal provide a claim on water resources. What matters in these cases is the security of 
those claims.   
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the future, insecurity of property rights also contributes to hold the poor in low 
yielding and unsustainable livelihood strategies. This is particularly relevant when 
returns from investments do not accrue until long after the investment is made. 
Also, insecure rights might force suboptimal choices, as in the case of renewable 
natural resource use where it fosters unsustainable resource management 
practices.  
Poverty and poverty traps can be exacerbated by lack of access to public 
services such as safe water and health facilities. Where collective action is present, 
it is often crucial for local public goods provision. Many communities around the 
world mobilize resources with own contributions and work, while others do not. The 
likelihood that this happens depends on the capacity to undertake collective action 
as well as on the specific incentive structure, which depends on the expected 
benefits from the good provision and the expectations about the behavior of others 
(Sandler, 1992; Ostrom et al., 1994; McCarthy, 2004). Here social cohesion, the 
history of cooperation, and trust—some of the building block of social capital—play 
an important role in determining the capacity of a group to work together and avoid 
free-rider behavior and in allowing to pool together resources and overcome credit 
constraints for provision of public goods and services.  
Collective action is also a means for the poor to secure access to benefit 
streams derived from resources. Property rights are only as strong as the 
institutions that back them up, and collective action can provide the collective 
support to secure claims (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan, 2002). Recognition of 
indigenous rights to resources and request for improvement in public service 
provision are two recurring examples. Especially in the case of common property 
resources, when individuals feel that their rights are threatened by outsiders or are 
neglected by official state authority, the ability to organize around a common goal 
to stake a claim to a resource can make a difference between neglect and 
acknowledgment of rights. Collective action through organizations such as farmers’ 
associations or even widespread social movements can provide a stronger voice in 
negotiations with government officials, NGOs, and others. Studies have shown that 
leadership is another important ingredient, apart from the capacity to cooperate, 
for successful acknowledgment of rights (Krishna, 2002).  
Risk and Uncertainty  
Poverty or well-being is determined not only by the assets and income of a 
household, but also by its degree of vulnerability. People have two options for 
confronting risk and uncertainty: mitigate exposure to risks (ex ante risk 
management) or act after a negative shock has occurred (ex post risk-coping). 
Clearly, most people undertake both. The vulnerability of a household to shocks is 
thus comprised of three components: 1) the exogenous characteristics of the risks 
and uncertainties (such as the distribution of rainfall); 2) the extent to which they 
engage in ex ante risk management strategies; and 3) the extent to which they can 
engage in ex post risk coping strategies.  
Though the potential impact of risk and uncertainty on subsistence farmers in 
developing countries has long been recognized (Roumasset et al., 1973; Hazell et 
al., 1986), empirically it remains a difficult issue to study because of heavy data 
requirements. Also, it is difficult and costly to capture farmers’ attitudes towards 
risk and uncertainty, though some methods have been developed (Moscardi and de  
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Janvry, 1977; Dillon and Scandizzo, 1978; Binswanger, 1980; Antle, 1987). The 
renewed emphasis on vulnerability is motivated by the knowledge that increased 
globalization introduces new uncertainties, and that—although the effects of global 
climate change remain uncertain—the occurrence of extreme weather events are 
predicted to become much more severe predominantly in tropical and semi-tropical 
countries (IPCC, 2001).  
Our purpose here is not to be exhaustive, but rather to point out the key 
links between different types of risks, poverty and vulnerability, and property rights 
and collective action. We first consider three broad classes of risks: natural, 
economic, and socio-political.  
Natural, economic, and socio-political risks 
In all three categories of risks, some of the risks will occur frequently, implying that 
people’s subjective assessment of the probability of having a relatively poor (or 
relatively good) outcome is likely to be well-formed. Other risks will occur only 
sporadically; people will generally have more difficulty in developing a good idea 
about the probability of these risks occurring. Finally, certain events might have 
some probability of occurring, but occur with such infrequency that there simply is 
no basis on which to assess that probability. We use these categories as illustrative; 
for instance, hail may occur regularly in some regions but only infrequently in 
others. Nonetheless, Table 1 below gives examples of these different types of risks 
acknowledging that certain risks and uncertainties might change categories, 
depending on the specific location under study.  
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Implications for poverty and vulnerability 
For well-defined and frequently-occurring events, wealthier people can often self-
insure or purchase formal insurance. Poor farmers, who are not able to buy 
insurance, often choose less risky subsistence crops (Fafchamps, 1992; Sadoulet 
and de Janvry, 1996), refrain form adopting new technologies (Feder et al., 1985; 
Antle and Crissman, 1990), lower investments (Skees et al., 1999), and diversify 
(Walker and Ryan, 1990). Thus, in the absence of viable insurance mechanisms, 
poor farmers have lower current incomes and are more likely to remain trapped in 
poverty because of low technology adoption, innovation, and investment levels.  
With respect to rare events, the poor as well as the others will find it difficult 
to plan ahead. However, savings and assets which the less poor possess can be 
used to insure against many unforeseen occurrences. In both developed and 
developing countries, citizens rely on the government to provide relief in the face of 
rare events such as natural disasters. Where effective, these policies should favor 
the poor relatively more though there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that aid 
in crises situations (such as famine or floods) does not arrive on time and is neither 
efficiently nor fairly distributed (Keen, 1994). In fact, today with the increasing 
uncertainty of climate change, many people remain exposed to large covariate 
climate shocks, and disaster prevention and long-term development plans remain 
ineffective, especially for the poor.  
With respect to large negative economic shocks, it is less clear that the poor 
will suffer relatively more. However, even asset market crashes, high inflation, or 
large swings in primary market products (such as coffee and cocoa) can lead to 
both temporary and chronic poverty (through distress sales, for example). 
Governments may also have safety net programs that protect the poor against 
economic shocks, but these are likely to be more limited than responses to natural 
disasters. It is difficult to tie safety net responses to specific economic shocks,
13 and 
more generic safety-net program benefits tend to get locked into the political 
system and be captured by powerful interest groups. 
As with natural and economic risks, socio-political risks may be well-
understood (such as election cycles) or may include infrequent or rare events. A 
major social risk and often a major concern of people in developing countries 
(Smith et al., 2001) is personal and property insecurity. The rich often enjoy a 
higher level of public police service and can afford to pay for private guards. In 
addition to the direct effect on well-being, people who are subject to high risk of 
attacks on their person or property may be more restricted in what they can do and 
may thus be unable to allocate their asset endowments towards activities that 
otherwise would increase their well-being.  
Implications for property rights and collective action 
Property Rights 
One potential option for reducing vulnerability is to increase the security of access 
to various resources for the poor. Even secondary or tertiary rights can play an 
                                                      
 
13 Even if the exact nature and extent of the shock is known (not likely), it may be more difficult to 
assess who is suffering than is the case with natural disasters.  
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important role in reducing vulnerability. Oftentimes, use of common (or state-
controlled) resources provides a safety net in times of extreme need. Such access 
functions as an ex-post mechanism to smooth consumption or maintain the asset 
base (such as livestock). Flexible access can help to absorb many shocks, including 
climatic, economic and, in certain cases, socio-political upheavals that affect local 
livelihoods. In fact, such access may be conditioned on the households’ having 
suffered a shock; access rights may fluctuate specifically to reduce a household’s 
exposure to risk. For example, pastoralists may be allowed to graze their herds on 
the land of another pastoral group during years when their home rangelands are 
affected by severe droughts (often with the expectation of a reciprocal 
arrangement). 
On the other hand, flexible access rights can also be quite costly. In times of 
generalized shocks—such as widespread and prolonged drought affecting large 
areas—flexible, informal property rights systems may lead to conflicts, increasing 
insecurity and risk of loss of property or person. That is, such rights may function 
best as safety-nets where idiosyncratic shocks affect only a small portion of the 
relevant population. Secondly, flexibility and informality may (though not 
necessarily) imply a relatively low degree of tenure security; claimants may not 
have the incentives, then, to manage and invest in the resource for sustainability.  
Thus, any attempts to increase tenure security must consider all of those 
that have pre-existing claims to the resource. If overlapping claims are not an 
issue, then moving to more formalized, individual claims to improve tenure security 
may increase security for the poor, enabling them to make sure that others (elites) 
will not grab the land in the future. But then, it goes without saying that any 
process to increase land tenure security, through formal titling for instance, must 
function in such a way that poor and marginalized members of society do not lose 
pre-existing claims to local elites through a process of land-grabbing. Legal aid and 
information on the process of titling must focus on educating the population about 
their rights and responsibilities in the process. In cases where there exists a 
complicated structure of overlapping claims, recognition of flexible access rights 
and multiple overlapping claims can increase tenure security and also acknowledge 
access rights of the poor and marginalized; however, developing methods to 
legitimize such systems and thus increase tenure security is quite difficult. A 
process of negotiating of who is included in the group, the respective strengths of 
claims, conflict resolution mechanisms, and then developing a legal framework that 
simultaneously recognizes local overlapping rights can be quite arduous, but it is 
still necessary if such systems are to be sustainable and accessible to the poor and 
marginalized.  
To summarize, increased tenure security in particular can be very valuable in 
reducing vulnerability to nearly any type of risk—be it natural, economic, or socio-
political, or be it frequently occurring or rare events. Mechanisms to improve 
security may be relatively straightforward in areas with relatively low climatic 
variability where most land-based resources are under private tenure. Increasing 
tenure security in highly variable environments with flexible tenure systems is likely 
to be more costly. If it is determined that greater tenure security would improve 
continued access by the poor (and others) novel tenure arrangements need to be 
developed. Unfortunately, very little is really known about the optimal design and  
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implementation of such tenure arrangements, and this remains a very important 
understudied research issue.  
Collective Action 
Collective action can be undertaken to address each of the three types of risks 
under each of the three categories. First, people often rely on social networks that 
function as insurance networks. Funeral societies are found in quite a number of 
countries and cultures and use a variety of mechanisms to provide an insurance 
function. Empirical work also bears out the capacity of local networks to smooth 
consumption (see the review of this literature in Hoddinott et al., 2003; Deaton, 
1992; Lim and Townsend, 1994; Kurosaki and Fafchamps, 2002). When one person 
suffers a shock, he or she can rely on family or friends to provide resources at least 
to smooth consumption and possibly to provide labor, or redistribute assets such as 
livestock. But, similar to flexible property rights, local insurance mechanisms are 
often unable to buffer households from large-scale shocks, particularly if the event 
is also long in duration, such as prolonged droughts or disability (Paxson, 1992; 
Udry, 1994; Fafchamps et al., 1998; Skoufias and Quisumbing, 2003). Collective 
action then needs to operate at higher levels in order that the group would have 
access to a sufficiently large resource base over which to spread risks.  
Additionally, a group dependent on non-private resources (common pool 
resources, for example) may act collectively to undertake risk management 
strategies that directly reduce exposure to a shock. For instance, a group may 
improve water supplies through various investment and maintenance activities, or 
the group members may jointly undertake soil erosion control measures that 
mitigate the impact of droughts or floods on the productivity of the natural resource 
base. The latter are activities that affect a wide cross-section of community 
members or perhaps all; in these cases, collective action will benefit all. However, 
the distribution of benefits and costs might either be income-neutral, progressive, 
or regressive depending on the distribution of costs and benefits between the poor 
and non-poor.  
Alternatively, a smaller sub-group may form to take advantage of economies 
of scale; for instance, relatively poor farmers might group together to bring produce 
to market and/or to gather and share market-information. Such activities can 
specifically reduce market risks; particularly where markets are imperfect and local 
traders otherwise enjoy a degree of bargaining power.  
Collective action may also be called upon to increase personal or property 
security (as in neighborhood watch programs). It can also enhance the political 
voice of local, often isolated, communities in order to increase tenure security of 
these groups, to make sure that government disaster-relief programs provide 
safety-nets in times of crises that are locally appropriate and available on time, and 
to provide information flows that reduce uncertainty over potential government 
policy changes.  
Nonetheless, as discussed earlier, it must be recognized that groups acting 
collectively are often co-opted by wealthier members who may find their own best 
interests somewhat at odds with group welfare. In many cases, it is precisely the 
very poor who are actively shunned by other community members and who are 
often excluded from joining or actively participating in local collective action, either 
by social exclusion or because they lack the time or other resources to participate. 
It is thus important not to romanticize the concept of collective action, but rather to  
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understand group formation, group dynamics and power relations, and to examine 
how decisions are made as to participation, making, monitoring, and enforcing 
agreements, and the resulting distribution of benefits and costs from collective 
action.  
Summarizing, collective action has been shown to be very effective in 
insuring against frequent and, to some extent, less frequent events, particularly 
when such events affect households differentially. Local collective action is much 
less effective in reducing exposure to generalized shocks—either natural or 
economic—simply because, by definition, such shocks affect a large portion of 
households. These shocks require tapping into external resources, such as from 
government, market, or international NGO assistance. However, collective action 
can be used to assert political voice, and could potentially ensure that local peoples 
are receiving the appropriate type of assistance at the right time. It is also possible 
that local collective action can feed into the process of designing disaster relief 
programs.  
Norms, Legal Structures, and Power Relations  
Legal, political, and power structures have a strong impact on the assignment of 
property rights and their change, the kind of collective action pursued, resulting 
livelihood strategies and, thus, on poverty reduction. They determine how property 
rights are negotiated in public arenas and if property rights to assets are accessible 
to the poor. They also affect collective action and its contribution to income 
generation as well as to participation and democratization. However, legal and 
power structures do not only differ considerably between countries but as also 
between governance levels.  
Legal and political structures 
Citizens in most developing countries are still confronted with the remnants of 
colonial legal legacies and their path dependencies on constitutional or institutional 
choices—having a strong impact on access to and use of resources and capacities 
for collective action. These legacies have contributed to control-and-command 
economies, dominant public sectors, and only limited willingness to give up 
concentrated power for more decentralized governance. Legal and political 
structures are blamed for inadequately addressing the livelihood needs of the poor, 
their marginalization, and withstanding attempts to raise their voice.  
However, since 1989 far-reaching institutional reforms took place, 
particularly of legal systems, power relations, and governance. Today some 
countries are in a dual transition to more democratic systems and market based 
economies (Gordon, 1996). Others concentrate on economic transition only 
(Ethiopia, PR China, Vietnam); some started from a difficult post-war situation (El 
Salvador, Nicaragua, Cambodia). Driving forces for these transitions have been: 1) 
the integration into world markets; 2) economic and institutional reforms through 
privatization, strengthening the price mechanism, and an enabling framework for 
contracts; 3) policy reforms for democratization and inclusion; and 4) a 
transparency-enhancing revolution in information technology (Srinivan, 2003; 
Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006; Gray, 1997; Posner, 1998; Pradhan, 1998; Shah, 
1998). Most ideas are intended to be inclusive by integrating the poor, protecting  
 
21 
human rights, breaking up monopolies, making politics more accountable, reducing 
income differences, and giving greater voice to people based on the idea of 
subsidiarity (Hay et al., 1996, Ngaido and Kirk, 2001). 
In some countries, these processes are driven forward half-heartedly, 
concentrating on economic reforms only while leaving out democratization. 
Governments hesitate to strengthen private law and to subsume, for example, all 
economic transactions into one civil code encompassing sale, rental, and mortgage 
contracts, including those on natural resources. Even countries that are pursuing 
reforms often underestimate and misinterpret the problems of adequately 
transforming legal and political structures and power relations and fail to create a 
comprehensive institutional environment that does not disadvantage the poor. 
A major source of misunderstanding arises from assumptions that property 
rights can be transformed merely by changing national laws. Bundles of property 
rights and multiple claims are deeply rooted in villages, communities, or ethnic 
groups (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan, 2002). Various legal mechanisms coexist: 
statutory, religious, customary, organizational law, and even donor law. Legal 
pluralism is, thus, more often the rule than the exception (Benda-Beckmann and 
Benda-Beckmann, 2001). Any rigid conception of statutory law, such as giving land 
security exclusively by individual titling, does not necessarily capture secondary or 
temporary access and use rights. 
In other circumstances, the statutory framework is not adequately enforced 
at lower levels. The state still competes with other informal mechanisms to deliver 
goods and services such as reputation and trust to enforce agreements and to 
resolve conflicts (Hay et al., 1996). In transition and post-conflict countries where 
mutual trust and social capital have been severely undermined, informal legal 
processes still fill gaps as screening devices in selecting reliable partners. In this 
context, complex and long-term contracts such as rental or inheritable leaseholds 
are rare, resulting in high economic costs, low innovation, and inaccessibility to the 
poor. 
Federalism and decentralization: role of the state and its performance  
There is strong evidence that enforcing contracts, limiting power of oligarchies, 
taming the leviathan, and including the marginalized requires multi-level 
governance. The idea behind federalism is a more efficient allocation of resources, 
local participation, and a sense of democratic community (Inman and Rubinfeld, 
1997). For a long time, fiscal federalism (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972) was used as 
a yardstick even for developing countries (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006). The 
competition between jurisdictions in supplying rival combinations of public goods 
would lead to their efficient supply—based on the assumption that citizens practice 
voice by electing local representatives or exit by moving to other jurisdictions. 
Federal structures ideally also reduce local information costs (Srinivan, 2003). 
Whereas uniformity and standardization are key drawbacks of centralized provision, 
the inability to exploit scale economies is the main one for decentralization 
(Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000a, 2003; Seabright, 1996).  
Decentralization assigns fiscal, political, and administrative responsibilities to 
the lower levels of government (Litvack et al., 1998; Meinzen-Dick et al., 2001). As 
Bardhan (2002) has discussed intensively, decentralization can help to change 
existing power structures and to improve participation by engaging the  
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disenfranchised in the political process. However, enthusiasm about (fiscal) 
federalism and decentralization has given way to a more critical perception where 
some results are being questioned (Dorn, 1990). Functioning decentralization 
implies a functioning administrative apparatus at lower jurisdictions and efficient 
control over it enabled by participatory democratic processes (Srinivan, 2003). 
With limited access to education, the poor can neither be part of this 
administration nor efficiently control it. Poor villagers, women, or tenants neither 
use their voice option to vote out incapable politicians (being their landlords) nor 
can they easily exit by moving to other jurisdictions (Litvack et al., 1998; Bardhan 
and Mookherjee, 2000b). Under these circumstances, corruption and lack of 
accountability remain endemic. There are even opposing opinions on 
decentralization as a means to reduce corruption, to secure property rights, and to 
enhance collective action (Seabright, 1996); decentralization will not necessarily 
defuse ethnic, religious, or other conflicts (Srinivan, 2003), as it may encourage 
state erosion and dissolution. In this case, it may even be misused by the central 
state to get rid of past obligations in times of tight budgets, as examples in 
rangeland management have shown (Ngaido and Kirk, 2001). 
Any successful decentralized delivery of public services critically depends on 
the accountability of decision makers. Those in power in a village need not share 
the center’s objectives for poverty reduction and may be less accountable to the 
poor (Galasso and Ravallion, 2005). Accountability implies not only informing about 
what local administrators are doing, but also the capacity to impose sanctions on 
those who have violated their public duties (Ackerman, 2004). This does not 
necessarily hold at local level (Litvack et al., 1998). Local information on under-
performance or corruption is difficult to get bundled and be used as a strategic 
resource. Thus, no uniform conclusions about relative vulnerability to special 
interest capture can be drawn. There is no simple relationship between the type of 
political system and poverty (Galasso and Ravallion, 2005). However, there seems 
to be an indication that decentralization is likely to benefit the poor if they have the 
ability to organize (Devas et al., 2004). 
Power, political voice, and poverty 
Decentralized governance may be necessary but not sufficient to implement and 
enforce the legal and regulatory framework at the local level and to support the 
poor. As we have seen, it very much depends on power relationship between 
claimants (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan, 2002). Power, by classical definition, is “the 
probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry 
out his own will even against resistance, regardless of the basis on which this 
probability rests“ (Weber, 1947:152). Those in power do not necessarily have the 
same interests with regard to road infrastructure, clean water, and secure property 
rights as other citizens have.  
Homogeneous communities are rather an exception. Heterogeneity may be a 
consequence of religious, ethnic or caste affiliation, occupational status, wealth 
differences, in-migration, or others. In these localities, decentralized programs 
aimed at the poor are in danger of capture, in particular, of public spending on 
private goods (Galasso and Ravallion, 2005). Inequality in asset holdings within 
villages affects the ability to devote time and money to participatory processes to 
make elites more accountable. Empirical studies have shown that the more unequal  
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the villages are in terms of land distribution, the worse the outcome of poorly 
targeted policies through public programs can be (Galasso and Ravallion, 2005). 
Participation through self-help is often regarded as a silver-bullet to break 
the vicious cycle of power, marginalization, and poverty. A regularity in cross-
country data shows that participatory political regimes are associated with 
significantly lower levels of aggregate economic instability and that participation 
contributes to moderate social conflicts and induces compromise (Hadenius and 
Uggla, 1996; Rodrik, 2000). However, participation is difficult to foster among the 
poorest. The very poor are generally excluded from participation due to their very 
high opportunity costs for meetings and coordination; others, who are able to 
attend, remain hesitant as effective participation requires a critical mass of 
activists. 
Besides free rider problems, participation may be weak as long as the right 
to form coalitions cannot be enforced. On the other hand, unless there is 
meaningful political participation by all groups, the mere existence of a democratic 
political system is insufficient, as in the example of India where a long democratic 
tradition did not widen the inclusion of low castes (Litvack et al., 1998). Similarly, 
democratization and political reform in Africa may not result in economic growth as 
elected governments can fail to implement unpopular economic policy reforms, 
impeding economic growth (Bates, 2006). Thus, the relationship between the type 
of political system and poverty are not straightforward (Kraay, 2004). The 
developmental states of early Europe and US and the recent East Asian experience 
suggest a positive role for the state in economic growth and development, where it 
is capable of formulating and implementing pro-poor policies, but is sufficiently 
embedded in society (Chang, 2002; Evans, 1995). 
Implications for property rights, and collective action 
Property Rights 
Securing property rights of productive resources and enabling their transfer or 
redistribution can significantly help the poor in escaping poverty traps. In 
particular, this is very relevant for land ownership in rural areas, as land is a major 
asset and also an important source of power. The assignment of legally secure, 
marketable rights to individuals and groups enhances efficiency and gives access to 
additional assets via rental and sales markets (Deininger and Kirk, 2003; Carter, 
2004). In addition, redistribution of land rights may be necessary to reduce 
inequality in asset ownership, break the power of oligarchies, and bring scarce 
resource into the hands of the most productive. Whether the land market alone can 
accomplish this redistribution or an active role of the state is needed, remains 
contested (Deininger, 2003).  
Any establishment of formal property rights through statutory law, however, 
may improve the situation of some of the poor partly while excluding others; 
formalizing ownership rights means weakening secondary, often temporary rights 
such as access options (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan, 2002). Besides ownership 
rights, there is a renewed focus on the functioning of the land rental market. The 
lifting of legal restrictions on tenancy in Asia (India, China) and Africa has given 
poor households new chances for self-employment. However, land owners are only 
willing to sign rental contracts if they are assured that no ownership claims will be 
brought forward by tenants (Deininger, 2003).  
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Simply redistributing land to the poor is one step, while giving beneficiaries 
an economic perspective on their farms is entirely another one (Deininger and Kirk, 
2003). Training and extension are required as well as management practice and 
access to credit and marketing. The ability to activate land sales and rental markets 
depends on the functioning of complementary rural financial markets (Carter, 2004; 
Deininger, 2003). If poor households are excluded from credit for farm inputs due 
to high transaction costs, owned or rented plots cannot be used productively. In 
addition, if tenure reforms are not well implemented (transparent titling) due to 
lack of information or capture strategies, the use of land as collateral remains 
costly. Land reforms will not work if beneficiaries do not organize themselves 
through collective action either as pressure groups or by forming joint marketing or 
credit. Thus, the poverty reduction impact of land reforms critically depends on 
complementary measures. In addition to the economic impacts on poverty, 
property rights reforms may have positive spillover effect in terms of enlarging the 
stake of the poor in the political system by strengthening local democracy 
(Bardhan, 2002). In India, for example, local democracy and institutions of 
decentralization work better in those states where land reforms and mass 
movements have been more active. Land redistribution can change the political 
structure in a village by integrating the poor into self-governing institutions. Land 
reforms stimulate competition for farm inputs in local markets and make it more 
difficult for established oligarchies to dominate these markets further. 
Strengthening the position of the poor ideally feeds back to the contextual factors: 
capture strategies of elites are weakened if land can be mortgaged after titling and 
new credit sources are opened, or if land improvements will be compensated in the 
case of contract for closure (Bardhan, 2002).  
Collective Action 
Collective action may work in two directions to address legal and power structures. 
First, it is an important lobbying instrument to shape norms and values as a guiding 
principle for institutional reforms. Collective action can influence the state to change 
the existing political balance into a more pro-poor direction. Through collective 
action, groups can more easily protect their interests vis-à-vis the state and when 
competing for their share of limited resources (Hadenius and Uggla, 1996). In case 
of implementation failure, collective action can substitute for missing state 
institutions. Secondly, collective action can lead to economic cooperation through 
saving clubs, farmers, herders or water associations, and service cooperatives. 
However, collective action at the local level often remains limited in its impact if it is 
not backed at the beginning by external support (such as international NGOs, 
donors, apex organizations).  
Since the 1990s, experiences have shown that policy changes have been 
influenced by local stakeholders through collective action. For example, in rural land 
registration in Cambodia village groups identify eligible beneficiaries, decide on plot 
boundaries, or settle conflicts (Zimmerman and Kruk, 2003). Collective action by 
pastoralists’ lobby groups has contributed to include their indigenous access rights 
during tenure reforms in Sahelian countries (Ngaido and Kirk, 2001). At higher 
levels, social movements such as the reformasi movement in Indonesia has created 
pressure for recognition of local rights over forest resources (Fay and Sirait, 2002), 
and peasant movements have been influential in pushing for land reform in Mexico, 
Russia, China, Japan, Bolivia, Cuba, Indonesia, and Zimbabwe (and less  
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successfully, in the Philippines, Brazil, and India). In reviewing these experiences, 
Huizer (1999) found indications that the involvement of peasant organizations in 
the struggle for land and its distribution led to more effective post-reform measures 
such as the formation of co-operatives or credit societies. 
Collective action also helps to disseminate information and publicize 
drawbacks of policy reforms (Litvack et al., 1998). Agrarian Reform Communities in 
the Philippines use mass media to inform the public about deadlocks in the 
implementation of land reforms (Polestico et al., 1998). In addition, pressure 
groups emerge spontaneously if conflicts arise from the resistance of land owners 
to hand over land. There are numerous examples where groups being dependent on 
common pool resources get stronger incentives to push for collective action if the 
national legislation acknowledges their group rights (Otsuka and Place, 2001; 
Meinzen-Dick et al., 2001). In addition, collective action is important if credit 
markets remain biased towards the more affluent, bad roads make marketing 
costly, or if lack of access to telecommunication leads to information asymmetries. 
In these cases, collective action can help to create hybrid organizations, either 
through informal arrangements for a single purpose (joint truck rental for 
marketing) or through formalized cooperation contracts (regular joint use of 
machinery), or even service cooperatives. 
These formalized organizations gain momentum through market liberalization 
and privatization. Their establishment through collective action delivers public 
goods (competition, lower prices) as well as club goods (extension, information) 
and private goods. However, their success is questioned if cooperative values have 
been discredited in the past, either through forced collectivization in socialist 
countries (Binswanger et al., 1995), appropriation by state agencies (Dülfer, 1994), 
or in case of excessive heterogeneity in local communities. 
Still, heterogeneity does not necessarily have a bad influence on collective 
action (Hadenius and Uggla, 1996): when people from different strata do 
cooperate, the effect in terms of overcoming problems of mistrust is probably 
greater than when people who already have much in common cooperate. 
Experiences of the first credit cooperatives in Prussia underline the role of affluent 
promoters contributing their human capital (Dülfer, 1994). To be sustainable, 
collective action often needs supplementary impulses from outside and generally 
has to be linked to other (apex) organizations of civil society to get national or 
international reach and to represent a forceful countervailing power. 
6. THE ACTION ARENA 
We now turn from an examination of the initial conditions in our framework to a 
more detailed analysis of the dynamics of the action arena. As noted in the 
preceding section, there are many ways in which collective action or changes in 
property rights institutions can address the conditions that keep people in poverty. 
But these changes often do not come about. To understand why or why not, an 
analysis of the action arena is helpful. This encompasses the actors, action 
resources that they draw upon, and the action situation. Analyzing the action arena 
allows us to understand how poor people are involved in contributing to collective 




Actors may be individuals, such as citizens of a state or of a community, or they 
may be collective entities, such as organizations acting as a coherent agent, e.g. a 
specific government department, a private company, the state, or an NGO. While 
collective actors such as organizations may, in principle, be able to act as coherent 
agents, they may often send ambiguous signals when there are internal 
contradictions within these.  
We first have to distinguish between internal and external actors and then 
sort out specific change agents among these actors. We define internal actors as 
those who are to follow the specific rule system, which emerges from institutional 
bargaining. External actors may influence the bargaining processes of institutions 
that define rule systems for other actors. These external actors may act as 
benevolent agents or as opportunistic rent-seekers.  
Change agents are those actors that can influence other actors towards a 
specific path of institutional change. Change agents can have a positive as well as a 
negative influence, and this influence may be intentional or unintentional. For 
example, a rent-seeking elite—or other interest group—may deliberately seek to 
bend institutional arrangements that favor their specific interests at the expense of 
others (Krueger, 1974). On the other hand, some development interventions, even 
though carried out with good intentions, have also yielded ambivalent impacts and 
thus may have created some unintentional negative side-effects.  
In neo-classical economics, rational actors are assumed to be perfectly 
informed, forward-looking utility maximizing agents with a coherent set of 
preference orderings. The insights from New Institutional Economics and recent 
findings from experimental economics show that behavior is often not forward-
looking and does not follow what rational choice would predict. Rather, we find ex-
post rationalizing behavior which is rule-bound (Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999), 
cognitively restricted by mental models (North, 1990), acknowledges norms of 
fairness (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), and satisfying rather than maximizing 
(Selten 1989). Knowledge of the rules and mental models is therefore important to 
understand behavior.  
To assess the effects of institutional change on poverty alleviation, we have 
to take a closer look at who the poor are, what characterizes them (see section 2), 
and which specific processes of institutional change affect them specifically and 
differently than the non-poor. In this, the distinction between moderately and very 
poor is essential because, while moderately poor may have some assets and be well 
embedded in social relations, the very poor are often chronically poor because they 
lack these assets and are not integrated into existing local social networks.  
In order to assess how the role of agency may be different for the poor than 
for other actors, we have to distinguish between different categories of action 
resources an actor possesses as well as the type of interactions—the action 
situations—where actors bring their action resources into play.  
Action resources 
As noted by Oliver and Shapiro (1995), “income feeds your stomach, but assets 
change your head.” That is, having secure assets provides security, which allows 
one to take a longer-term perspective and hence take advantage of opportunities.  
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Indeed, so fundamental are assets to the ability to make choices, that Alsop and 
Heinsohn (2005) use psychological, informational, organizational, material, social, 
financial, or human assets as indicators of agency. Both tangible and intangible 
assets play a major role in shaping the action resources of individuals, households, 
and even communities. Action resources are those intangible and tangible assets 
that give actors the capability for agency. Agency includes the capabilities to 
exercise livelihood choices, to participate in collective action on various levels, to 
influence other actors' agency choice as well as to involve in political processes. 
Many of the potential effects of assets were discussed above in section 5; in this 
section we focus on less tangible action resources and how they influence social 
bargaining  
Information and the ability to process it 
Information and knowledge are key power resources (Schlüter, 2001; Theesfeld, 
2004) and enable the powerful actor to change the perceived values of the different 
alternatives for action (Young, 1995). If no market exists, information considered 
valuable will often be slowly distributed for fear of reducing its value (Bouquet and 
Colin, 1999). Since information often spreads through networks and relationships, 
the access to or the cost of acquiring information is often unequally distributed. 
Hence, it is the social nature of information flows which may place the poor in a 
particular disadvantage, because they may not be part of networks through which 
information spreads. Knowledge is the coupling of information with the skills to use 
it. Skills can be classified into expert power (hard skills) and personal power (soft 
skills). Expert power originates from both education and experience (Alston et al., 
1996) and enables one to use information more efficiently. Personal power is linked 
to charisma, to communication, or to agitation capabilities. These personal 
characteristics appear to be of major importance when dealing with informal 
institutions emerging from interaction at the local level (Schlüter, 2001).  
Knowledge is further differentiated according to geographical scale because 
having knowledge about one's own community and the social functioning of it is a 
different sort of thing than knowing about global phenomena, modern technology, 
etc. Tacit knowledge is based on experiences while academic knowledge is based on 
structured learning. Which of the two is more important in a specific power contest 
depends on the particular social bargain. Krishna (2002) found that where local 
agents had a good understanding of outside processes, they were able to direct 
collective action toward positive development outcomes.  
Cognitive schemata 
Cognitive schemata, or mental models, define the borders of what is imaginable to 
an actor in both his/her understanding (knowledge) and normative perspective and 
thus provide the limits of what an actor can perceive as feasible in his/her life. 
Douglas North uses the term “ideology” in describing these two aspects. First, 
ideology offers us a reality, a mental model, or a cognitive map. Second, it 
proposes a guideline of how the world should be structured, i.e. the normative 
aspect of ideology (North, 1990). Cognitive dissonance—the difference between 
mental models and the way the world works—affects whether an actor can think 
and process what is going on. This may be a challenge particularly for those who  
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have never been exposed to the outside and/or to things that challenge their 
thinking. Risk aversion, which is often attributed to the poor, may not only result 
from the poor asset stock, but equally from limited exposure to the outside world 
that may restrict their capability to think beyond specific boundaries.  
Furthermore, ideologies in the normative sense—sharing an imagination of 
how the world ought to be—are essential for legitimizing group solidarity. This 
principle is frequently applied by those who have ruling power in sub-groups, who 
use social conflict in society for cementing and fostering patron-client relations 
along kinship lines, with the result that the poor become even more dependent on 
the rich.  
Social prestige 
The "habitus" an actor demonstrates in the public and private realm (Bourdieu and 
Accardo, 1993) is essential to how he or she can gain recognition as a leader in 
public discourse and collective action. How does an actor behave, what clothes does 
he/she wear, what cultural knowledge can he/she show in public? How can he/she 
speak in public? This habitus may become an important power resource to influence 
the perceived choices available to other actors. For example, in deeply hierarchical 
societies, such as the Indian caste system, actors from low caste origin may not be 
used to speak in public, and their habitus may signal subordinate behavior, which 
cannot be easily overcome, whereas the high caste elite has grown up in the 
repeated exercising of social superiority. Such schemata of social habitus cannot be 
easily overcome. They are often rooted in cognitive schemata, which are constantly 
reconstructed in social interaction.  
Social standing is also influenced by the embeddedness of an actor in social 
networks in a community—both informal and formal. Social networks may be 
essential when they provide space for actors to combine forces and to increase their 
relative leverage power in order to reinforce their own identities and self-
confidence. Women’s savings groups around the world, for example, when 
successful, often increase the bargaining power and the confidence of women to 
also use this bargaining power in the public realm.  
Recognized membership in specific organizations may be a necessary entry-
point to the public arena where collective action is negotiated. For example, many 
irrigation associations allow only landowners or heads of households to be 
members. Wives or landless households are not included and hence do not 
participate in public discourses over collective action for managing the irrigation, 
although they are affected by the decisions of the group (Meinzen-Dick and 
Zwarteveen, 1998). At the same time, formal membership may not be sufficient to 
have a say because relative bargaining power also depends on other action 
resources.  
Both the habitus of an actor and the ability to draw upon social networks 
influence what recognition local actors receive from outside the immediate 
community. Hence, they provide the space for networks with powerful actors on a 
higher spatial level than the village. In many clientele societies, these political 
assets are an important source of benefit streams, for example in the form of 
employment, welfare benefits, etc. These may affect not only the capabilities of 




The poor cannot easily allocate time for purposes other than income earning and 
livelihood activities. For example, poor women in many regions have to work hard 
throughout the day and can hardly afford to participate in public meetings because 
they are busy with fetching firewood, collecting water, preparing food, and so on. 
Similarly, contributing labor to collective activities may prevent poor wage laborers 
from earning their daily income. Opportunity costs of time may, however, change 
over the year; wage laborers may be able to participate in collective action when 
there are no work opportunities available to them in specific time periods of the 
cultivation cycle. Thus, timing and location of meetings and other collective 
activities will affect the extent to which poor people can attend and influence 
decisions.  
Tangible assets 
As noted above, a defining characteristic of poverty is paucity in tangible household 
assets. In addition to time or labor contributions, participation in collective action or 
even membership in social networks often requires some financial contribution, 
gifts, or hospitality. If poor households are not able to contribute or reciprocate due 
to lack of assets, they may gradually fall out of social networks and institutions that 
govern resource access and property rights, in particular if membership depends on 
contributions.  
Asset-poor people often face a trade-off between short-term requirements 
and long-term needs: while it may be quite costly to participate (due to required 
contributions or foregone opportunities to earn), not participating may, in the long 
term, undermine the social embeddedness of the actor in the social network. In the 
Bangladesh participatory poverty assessments, such social relations were a defining 
characteristic of different categories of the poor. The social poor may not always be 
able to feed their families but could still provide some hospitality and are trusted in 
the community. Among other deprivations, the helpless poor cannot entertain 
guests. The bottom poor have very little social interaction, are not even invited for 
hospitality by others, and are therefore screened out of NGO groups which provide 
loans or other assistance (Nabi et al., 1999). 
Those with more assets have more options to pursue their livelihoods or 
other objectives, both individually and collectively. Someone with a large farm, rich 
soils, and reliable water supplies may be able to choose which crops to grow. If, in 
addition, they have education, a vehicle, and live near good roads, they have more 
options for off-farm activities. Those with surplus time and abilities may also choose 
to lead collective activities. Those with fewer assets may still participate in 
collective endeavors to overcome the limitations of their individual assets. But the 
very poor with meager assets may be limited in both the individual and collective 
activities in which they can participate.  
In most societies tangible assets also convey status. The wealthiest 
households with most land occupy a higher place in many agrarian societies, while 
the landless may not even be considered full community members. This has 
repercussions also for access to information and other collective resources. In many 
agrarian societies, extension agents are most likely to visit wealthier landowners 
than landless tenants. Even within the household, control over assets influences the  
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bargaining power of individuals. Fathers who control the household land may 
exercise authority over their sons. Research has shown that women with control 
over assets have more decision-making power in intrahouseshold decisions 
(Quisumbing et al., 2004).  
Action resource, power endowments, and the social bargain 
Generally, an actor exercises power if he or she can affect someone's freedom of 
action: the more powerful actors can change, distort, and/or restrict the 
(perceived) choices available to the other actor(s) (Weber, 1947:152). This includes 
the ability to change the other players' preferences, cognitive schemata, and 
constraints they face. If we use a game theory conceptualization, an actor's power 
resources are the player's capabilities to change the payoff structure of the other 
player(s). The analysis of power resources makes sense only in a comparison of 
various actors and their power asymmetries relative to each other (Schlüter, 2001).  
Social bargaining and action resources 
In social bargaining, we need to distinguish between the actors, their action 
resource endowments, and the specific action situation. Action resources may have 
different leverage power in different (inter)action situations. For example, an action 
resource that may be highly valuable in situation A may not be of much use in 
situation B. In other words, the type of interaction determines the transformation of 
potential into effective action resources. Rules governing the interaction therefore 
play a critical role in how action resources are translated into bargaining power. 
In considering the relative bargaining power, we can distinguish between (1) 
positional power and (2) sanctioning power. Positional power stems from an actor's 
office or structural position, which may allow this actor to access specific 
information or to hold information away from other actors, to access specific 
political networks, or to execute power on other actors, for example in distributing 
welfare benefits. Unevenly distributed sanctioning power, on the other hand, offers 
specific actors the ability to impose their choice on other actors, for example, 
through the use of resources to credibly commit in a bargaining situation or to 
credibly retaliate in case of non-compliance.  
Collective action, social bargaining and the action arena 
Social bargaining affects collective action in two ways: first, in defining the 
contribution the participants have to make, and second, in distributing the benefits 
that they may derive—individually—from collective action. Social bargaining is 
governed through rules that specify which actions are required, permitted, and 
prohibited. These rules often represent the relative bargaining power of the 
participants involved (Knight, 1992). 
Ostrom (1992) defines three different sets of rules for collective action: 1) 
operational rules that govern day-to-day decisions; 2) collective choice rules that 
affect how operational rules are to be changed and who can change them; and 3) 
constitutional choice rules that are used in crafting collective rules. Rules are 
generally nested. That is, it is typical for one set of rules to define how other sets of 
rules can be changed. Constitutional choice rules often govern how much agency 
and influence asset-poor group members can develop in collective action. For  
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example, asset-poor members of a group in hierarchical societies may be excluded 
from crafting collective choice rules because traditional constitutional choice rules 
confine such decisions to a few traditional leaders. Then, constitutional choice rules 
already embody the differentials in action resources of different group members, 
such as in the form of social prestige. 
How constitutional rules define the principles of collective choice rules affects 
people’s choice set: if deliberation of all users is the constitutional rule, then poor 
people may have a better say than if it is based on the decision of an elders’ 
council. However, even deliberation, the uncoerced debate of all users, will be 
influenced by the action resources of the participants; their information and 
knowledge will determine if they can make an informed decision, their cognitive 
schemata may influence what they perceive as appropriate to say in public, their 
social prestige will influence whether they may dare to speak in public, and their 
time resources will determine whether or not they can afford to take part in such 
deliberation processes in the first instance. The process and outcomes of such 
deliberations will be influenced by actor’s action resources and by how these are 
employed in the specific action arena. 
Patterns of interaction 
The actors, their action resources, and the applicable rules all delimit the space 
within which actors make choices and take action in a specific action situation. The 
action situation is shaped by the asset endowments and action resources of the 
actors, their relative positioning, and the a priori rules as defined by the initial 
condition. Accordingly, different actors will have different limits and opportunities 
within any single action situation. In the action arena, parties act independently, 
wait for actions of counterparts, cooperate, discuss, negotiate, challenge each 
other, and so on. They exchange resources, devise new rules, and demand action 
from other parties. Repetition of these bargaining processes leads to interaction as 
regularized and observable behavioral outcomes. In these interaction processes, 
actors reinforce existing institutions and create new institutions.  
These patterns of interaction gradually form social relationships and 
structure, which can reduce or reinforce poverty, and lessen or increase social 
inequality and exclusion. As these patterns of interaction affect the constitutional 
level of rules, we find societies shaped by patron-client relations, neo-
patrimonialism, ethnic antagonisms, caste differentials, or based on democratic 
decision-making. These patterns of interaction also transpire into the very nature of 
the state and how the state acts and develops its own administrative and political 
structures. In this sense, the institutional outcomes constitute the outcome of prior 
social bargaining that reflects the unequal action resources of different social 
actors. 
One important choice actors may have to face is the choice between 
cooperation with others or non-cooperation. Let us assume that an individual 
contribution to a common irrigation system through participation in maintenance 
activities would allow the group to achieve better irrigation overall. A poor person 
has to decide in this case whether to cooperate or not. In this situation, a few 
factors will affect the choice of the poor. First, we can ask: what is the choice 
opportunity set of the poor? The opportunity set is clearly affected by the 
contextual conditions. In the specific situation we can ask: Do the constraints of  
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being very poor limit the ability to choose to contribute to maintaining the irrigation 
system? If that is the case, we should ask ourselves of what could be done to 
reduce or remove the obstacles to cooperation. Second, the choice to contribute to 
maintenance depends also on the expected outcome of cooperation. Thus, if the 
poor person feels that he or she might not benefit from improved irrigation flow 
because of discrimination in the allocation of water, he or she will decide not to 
cooperate. On the other hand, in a choice like this, to achieve joint benefits, all 
involved actors have to cooperate, producing a pattern of reciprocity (Oakerson, 
1992). This is only one example of a possible choice in an action situation and 
resulting pattern of interaction; there are numerous different action situations. 
In turn, patterns of interactions produce outcomes. If outcomes are positive 
for all those involved, actors will maintain the structure of the situation. When 
outcomes are not positive for all actors or for some of the actors, these will try to 
change their strategies. Negotiations in action situations often regard distributional 
aspects related to expected outcomes. 
This framework can be used to analyze whether the types of collective action 
or property rights reforms discussed in the preceding section as being 
advantageous to the poor are likely to come about. In any particular situation, it 
leads us to ask: Who are the actors (who may be for or against the particular 
change)? What are their respective action resources? Given the rules governing this 
situation (operational, collective choice, or constitutional), which action resources 
are most important? Do the poor or disadvantaged have those resources?  
For example, in social bargaining over the distribution of water resources in a 
government-managed irrigation system, connections to the officials or money for 
side payments may be important action resources. If management is transferred to 
water users’ associations, others might have more influence on decisions, but if 
membership in the users’ association is limited to owners of irrigated land, then 
land ownership becomes very important, and pastoralists or other water users may 
have no voice. Further, if meetings are held in the evening with public debate, then 
women may not have the critical action resources, especially time and habitus 
(Meinzen-Dick and Zwarteveen, 1998).  
Based on this analysis, programs to help the poor can either attempt to build 
up the critical action resources of that group (such as numerous programs in South 
Asia to teach women to speak up in public) or to change the rules so that the action 
resources they do not possess are less important (for example, by changing rules 
for membership so that all households are included, not just those with irrigated 
land, or holding shorter meetings, closer to the homes, so that women can 
participate). In effect, many government or NGO programs, and actions and 
lobbying by disadvantages groups themselves have been working at one or another 
of these strategies. Examples include the Indian government’s reforms of the 
panchayati raj (local government) system to include reserved seats for women and 
scheduled castes and tribes, or the efforts of many microfinance systems to build 
financial, social, and human capital among landless groups or women. This 
framework, however, allows for a more coherent assessment of different action 





When evaluating outcomes of action situations we can distinguish between 
structural outcomes, which affect the existing contextual factors, including property 
rights and collective action institutions (see feedback loops in figure 1), and 
outcomes that directly affect the conditions of the poor. For example, people 
working together to build an irrigation system may be able to increase the stability 
of water supply for their crops, thereby increasing the asset base. Structural 
outcomes will later affect direct outcomes for the poor. Thus, an increased asset 
base in turn will increase the productivity potential and in the end reduce 
vulnerability and raise incomes. In addition, people acting together can change 
political conditions and social institutions. Thus, the creation of an irrigation user 
group, which devises rules for managing and enforcing regulations, can improve 
irrigation management and performance. On a larger scale, forms of collective 
action and mobilization can affect policy decisions at the national level as well.  
Institutions as well as political and social conditions are not unchanging. 
Property rights systems themselves are dynamic: the distribution of rights as well 
as how they are interpreted and enforced will change over time. Some of these 
changes are driven by changing material conditions including population pressure 
and resource scarcity (Demsetz, 1967). But mostly, changes in property rights are 
the outcomes of political processes, reflecting changed social preferences in relation 
to the patterns of interaction among members of society (Bromley, 1989). These 
result in reallocation of economic opportunities within society. Finally, changes in 
property rights do not need to be at the advantage of society as a whole, but can 
favor some groups over others. An interest group can try to change rules to its 
advantage and at the disadvantage of other groups and thus try to affect the 
“redistribution of economic advantage” (Bromley, 1989:249). Therefore, 
interactions in the action arena can lead to changes in institutions of property rights 
at the advantage or disadvantage of the poor.  
Collective action is, by definition, dynamic. While the underlying institutions, 
including both organizations such as farmers’ associations as well as social 
institutions like norms of mutual assistance, can provide some stability to repeated 
forms of collective action, even these institutions change over time. Poor people 
may be able to influence change in these institutions in their favor, but their lower 
levels of action resources makes such outcomes more difficult to achieve. Since 
poor people are at a disadvantage in terms of communication and resources to 
achieve social and institutions change, cooperation amongst them can provide them 
with a collective resource that can raise their voices (Kertzer, 1989:104-108) to 
demand changes. A wide range of peasant movements, indigenous people’s 
movements, and women’s groups such as SEWA (Self Employed Womens’ 
Association) demonstrate the potential for this. Although organization and 
coordination of cooperation has its costs (Olson, 1965), it also has many benefits 
(Hirschmann, 1982: 82-91). According to Lipsky (1968), for example, forms of 
collective contention can be considered a resource in itself. Thus, for the poor to 
achieve structural changes in their society, often requires collective action to 
challenge existing institutions. Recent empirical evidence seems to support this,  
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indicating the one important determinant of the ability of the poor to help 
themselves is their ability to organize (Devas et al., 2004). 
External change agents can assist in such processes by providing institutional 
openings, by forming alliances with the poor, and by negotiating cooperative 
platforms with policy level actors. They can help to transform contention into 
cooperation among various groups. However, the complexity of institutional change 
means that outcomes favorable to the poor are not automatic, even if external 
agents are genuinely interested in reducing poverty. For example, when the poor 
depend on clientele networks with the rich, empowerment of poor groups against 
the more powerful can also backfire and disempower the poor even more, if falling 
out of the earlier clientele network leaves them worse off than before.  
From various examples in the paper we have seen that the distribution and 
strength of property rights are critical for maintaining, increasing, or reducing 
poverty. Collective action can, but need not necessarily, leverage the power 
between more powerful and weaker groups. However, in the case of property 
rights, it is not only the formal rights that matter, but how they are put into 
practice. Similarly, it is not collective action per se, but how it is institutionalized 
and organized that matters. This leads to complex issues of rent-seeking, horizontal 
inequalities, and power plays between actors that need to be considered in order to 
understand how property rights and collective action can affect the outcomes of 
specific action situations.  
Poverty outcomes 
In terms of more direct outcomes, or the outcomes originating from earlier 
structural changes on poverty itself, we suggest that these can be evaluated 
according to a number of poverty dimensions. In figure 1 we suggest six evaluative 
criteria to assess poverty reduction, which consist of improvements in the ability to 
cover basic needs, increases in income, in personal security and security of 
property, and improvements in social and political inclusion, and sustainability of 
livelihood strategies. 
The traditional measure of increased income remains a crucial indicator. 
However, it is best to rely on multiple indicators to assess the degree on 
improvement in people’s livelihood, if we believe that wellbeing in not determined 
by income alone. The improvement in the ability of the poor to secure basic needs 
such as shelter, clothing, and improved health are basic indicators to assess 
extreme poverty. Improvement in basic need provision can derive from increased 
incomes, but can also derive from increased access to public services, especially for 
the improvement in health conditions. Similarly, improved access to education has 
been recognized as an important indicator to reduce the risk of intergenerational 
transmission of poverty (Hoddinott et al., 2003).  
It can also be important to determine if changes in income have had any 
effects on the ability of the poor to start building assets and if productive 
investments and increase returns have allowed them, for example, to acquire a plot 
of land, increase their livestock holdings, or send a child to school. These will affect 
longer-term paths out of poverty, influencing both vulnerability to future shocks as 
well as future incomes. Assets can also be increased by implementation of 
redistributive policies such as land reforms, which will in turn affect income 
opportunities.   
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Another important indicator of poverty relates to income distribution. Since 
poverty is also relatively determined, an increase in inequality, even if the income 
of the poorest has not declined, de facto leads to further disadvantage. If the 
majority is getting better off, staying behind means losing out in terms of 
purchasing capacity and often also in terms of social exclusion.  
We have seen earlier that in order to escape poverty it is also important to 
reduce risk exposure and improve the mechanisms of the poor to cope with risks. It 
is therefore important to observe how income improvements, changes in assets, 
access to services, or improved cooperation capacity translate into reduced 
vulnerability of the poor to future shocks.  
As with vulnerability, an investigation of sustainability of livelihood strategies 
can also give us important indications about impacts of changes on the poor and 
about their prospects for the future. Thus, the clear felling of a community woodlot 
can bring substantial increases in income over the short term but might not results 
in sustained improvement in livelihoods. It threatens the asset-base that sustains 
income activities, reducing the capacity to earn income in the future. Management 
practices that take into account long-term wellbeing, such as through felling tree 
practices and rules that into account re-growth rates, retain certain areas for future 
use or are accompanied by replanting activities, are more sustainable and, even if 
short term income increases might be smaller, can provide more security and help 
reduce vulnerability to shocks.  
In terms of security, changes in personal security and security of property 
are also important indicators affecting well-being. This is particularly important in 
conflict and post-conflict areas and often in the more degraded and crime prone 
areas of cities. Security concerns can literally stall a number of strategies geared at 
the improving livelihood and escaping poverty. In addition, personal security 
represents a direct improvement in wellbeing, as the absence of threat and fear is 
of direct benefit to people. We can recall that improved security of property can be 
achieved through institutional change and provides incentives to people to invest in 
productive activities. Field (2004) found that Peru’s program to provide land titles 
to urban squatters who built houses on public lands increased the security in those 
homes as a result of higher recognition and police protection (since the residents 
had gone from the wrong to the right side of the law), and this, in turn, allowed 
more household members to go out for work or schooling because someone was 
not required to stay at home to guard the house.  
Improvements in social and political inclusion are also important outcomes 
for poverty reduction. These are generally consequences of greater structural 
changes, when actions of people and groups through reforming pattern of 
interactions achieve fundamental changes in contextual conditions. Examples would 
include changing gender relations toward greater empowerment of women or 
greater voice and self-determination of indigenous peoples. Because they are often 
linked to long term developments, outcomes related to social and political inclusion 
are difficult to detect and need to be investigated in long-term analysis.  
In sum, direct outcomes from the action arena and long terms contextual 
changes can be evaluated in terms of how the poor and non-poor fare on all the 
critical aspects of poverty: the ability to secure basic needs, the level and 
distribution of income, degree of personal security and security of property, degree 
of social and political inclusion, vulnerability, and sustainability. While the exact  
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outcomes will vary depending on human agency, the initial conditions and action 
resources available to various actors also shape these outcomes. However, 
understanding how to influence collective action and property rights institutions 
merits serious attention as part of poverty reduction strategies.  
8. CONCLUSION 
Property rights (or the lack thereof) over a range of assets constitute a defining 
characteristic of poverty. Proper understanding of how the poor can protect and 
expand their access to and control over resources can make a powerful contribution 
to poverty reduction. Many poverty reduction programs, from group-based 
microfinance to cooperatives to community-driven development initiatives, are 
premised upon collective action. A better understanding of the conditions that favor 
collective action by the poor themselves and of how external institutions can 
support it is also crucial for poverty reduction. However, much of the conceptual 
and empirical literature on property rights and collective action has dealt primarily 
with natural resource management rather than poverty reduction. Our attempt in 
this paper is to bridge these domains so that the understanding of the role of 
collective action and property rights institutions can lead to more effective poverty 
reduction by poor people themselves and by external agencies. At the same time, 
poverty studies offer key insights that can lead to better understanding and 
programs for natural resource management, by pointing to potential asset 
thresholds and poverty traps as well as the central importance of agency and 
capabilities of all people, including poor men and women.  
Three characteristics of the initial conditions of the poor are particularly 
relevant for understanding the constraints and opportunities they face. These 
include their assets (including natural, physical, financial, human, and social 
capital), the sources of risk and uncertainty that cause vulnerability, and the power 
structures created by the legal and governance systems. Understanding the effects 
of existing property rights and collective action rules affect the conditions of the 
poor can go a long way to inform policymakers on how to better achieve poverty 
reduction goals. Equally importantly, identifying mechanisms that enable the poor 
to take advantage of the potential of these key institutions can enable them to 
make direct improvements in their wellbeing and even change the contextual 
factors which keep people in poverty. 
Power plays an important role in the process of institutional change. In our 
framework, power comes in at two levels. On the one hand, the broader power 
structure of a society creates a specific context within which power struggles in the 
local action arena take place. This power context depends on who rules the country, 
who dominates the administration, and so on. On the level of the action arena, we 
find actors with different action resources and power endowments. The power 
endowments depend on the action resources an actor can put into play and the 
specific interaction situation. There is, though, a general trend: the poor have much 
less action resources at hand compared to the less poor, and this already places 
them in a relative disadvantage independently of the specific action situation. Social 
networks often are inclusive of their members and exclusive toward outsiders. 
Since the poor often lack the resources to invest in reciprocal social relationships  
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that go beyond their own spheres, they are often not part of those powerful 
networks.  
The examples given in this paper illustrate the great variety of outcomes that 
are possible. While human agency certainly plays a major role in these outcomes, 
the options available to men and women are strongly conditioned by their material 
conditions and the institutional environment in which they live. But people’s action 
and interactions can also shape both the physical and institutional environment in 
which they operate. Understanding these effects can provide insights into how 
policies and programs can improve the choices and capabilities of poor people to 
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